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Background: Though 85% of financing HIV/AIDS program was domestic resources, Global Fund (GF) programs
played a significant role in prevention interventions and treatment for non-Thai Key Affected Populations (KAP) and
migrants. As upper-middle income country, Thailand is not eligible for GF support. This study identified the
remaining challenges and funding for prevention interventions for Thai and non-Thai KAP and migrants if GF
supports were to curtail.
Methods: Qualitative method was applied including document review and in-depth interviews of 21 key informants
who were Principal Recipients, Sub-recipients, provincial level program implementers and policy makers in health
financing agencies. A multi-stakeholder consultation workshop was convened to discuss recommendations.
Results: The “public financed public services model” where Principal and Agents were the same entities resulted in less
accountability than the “contractual agreement” in GF programs where the Principal Recipients, as the Agents were
more accountable to the GF as Principal through results based financing. If GF supports were to curtail, impacts on the
current programs would be varied from low to high degree of negative consequences. Scale down the scope and
targets, while keeping the most critical components were common coping mechanisms. All three, except one,
Principal Recipients had difficulties in fund mobilization. Prevention among non-Thai KAP and migrants were identified
as the remaining challenge.
Conclusions: A pooled funding mechanism from multiple domestic sources was proposed. Replacing the conventional
public-financed-public-service by a contractual model was preferable. The GF should continue funding the
non-Thai KAP and migrant as transition mechanism. Multi-countries or regional programs especially at the
border areas were priorities.
Keywords: Principal-Agent relationship, Thailand, Global fund, Key Affected Populations, MigrantsBackground
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis (TB), and
Malaria (GF), founded in 2002, is the largest inter-
national funding instrument to support prevention and
treatment of HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria. GF mobilized
and disbursed funding to countries with high disease
burdens but had limited capacities to address them. In
2011, it disbursed US$ 2.6 billion to countries based on
the technical merits of proposals submitted to and
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distribution, and reproduction in any mediumthe GF Board. In 2011, 57% of total funding was disbursed
for HIV and TB/HIV co-infections, 23% for malaria, 15% for
TB and the remaining for health systems strengthening [1].
The contributions by GF expanded exponentially;
the 2002 grants disbursed to 36 countries [2] has ex-
panded to 151 countries, including Thailand, in 2012 [3].
Application and implementation of GF programs were
based on country ownership and participation through
multi-stakeholder platform of Country Coordination
Mechanisms (CCM) [4].
HIV/AIDS was a major public health problem in
Thailand in terms of mortality and Disable Adjusted Life
Year loss [5]; rapid and effective responses had turned
the 1980s “generalized” to “concentrated” epidemics ind Central Ltd. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly cited.
Table 2 Thailand’s profiles of eligibility to 2012 GF
HIV/AIDS TB Malaria
Eligibility criteria
● Income category UMI UMI UMI
● Is the country on the OECD-DAC
list of ODA recipients?
Yes NA NA
● What is the disease burden of the
country for each component?
High Severe Severe




● Is the country eligible to submit a
proposal in the General
Funding Pool?
No No No
● Partial prioritization score (income
level and disease burden, the
minimum partial score is 3 and
the maximum is 12)
NA 7 7
Targeted funding pool
● Is the country eligible to submit a
proposal in the Targeted Funding
pool?
No No No
Source: GF Eligibility List.
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/core/eligibility/Core_EligibleCountries2012_
List_en/ [access on 26 March 2013].
Note: UMI = Upper Middle Income.
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sex workers, men having sex with men and intravenous
drug users. In 2003, Thailand introduced a tax-financed
universal anti-retroviral therapy (ART) resulting in a
significant reduction in HIV/AIDS mortality [6,7].
Government commitment to deal with HIV/AIDS was
demonstrated by increased total spending on HIV/AIDS.
Prior to 2008 there was no systematic resource tracking on
HIV/AIDS. Spending on HIV/AIDS programs increased
from 1.9% of Total Health Expenditure in 2008 to 2.4% in
2011; or increased from US$ 431 to US$ 675 per capita
people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) in the same period.
See Table 1. Domestic resource was a majority, up to 85%
of total AIDS expenditure during 2008–2011. Of the inter-
national sources, GF was the largest contributor, more than
70% of overall international funding [8]. Though inter-
national funding was a small fraction; it largely contributed,
41%, to HIV prevention while the majority, 84% of total do-
mestic funding was spent on treatment and care [9].
With reference to the 23rd GF Board meeting in May
2011 [10], a new Eligibility, Counterpart Financing and
Prioritization policy was adopted for all funding chan-
nels, by taking into account the country’s income level,
disease burden and recent funding history. GF policy
change has affected HIV/AIDS funding opportunities
to Thailand. Although burden was high; with a his-
tory of recent funding, Thailand is neither eligible to
submit a proposal for General nor Targeted Funding
Pool, see Table 2.
Policy makers and practitioners were concerned about
how Thailand prepared itself given GF policy changesTable 1 Key indicators on HIV/AIDS financing, Thailand
2008-2011
2008 2009 2010 2011
Total AIDS expenditure,
million Baht
6,928 7,208 7,733 9,922
Total Health Expenditure,
million Baht
363,771 383,051 392,368 408,718
Financing sources
● Domestic, % Total AIDS
expenditure
85 93 85 85
● International, % Total AIDS
expenditure
15 7 15 15
Total AIDS expenditure
● per capita population, Baht 110 114 121 154
● per capita PLWHA, Baht 14,275 14,417 15,487 20,594
● per capita population, US$ 3.3 3.3 3.8 5.1
● per capita PLWHA, US$ 430.9 415.2 488.7 675.4
● % of Gross Domestic
Product
0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09
● % Total Health Expenditure 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.4
Source: National Expenditure on HIV/AIDS 2008–2009 and 2010–2011 report.and its significant contributions to HIV prevention.
This study, with a scope limited to HIV/AIDS program
(excluding TB and Malaria), compared the programmatic
and financing natures between the GF and government
funded programs, assessed the potential impacts and the
coping mechanism by Principal Recipient (PR) if the GF
supports were to cease, identified the remaining chal-
lenges of prevention interventions for the KAP and finally




In line with the objectives, a research framework was
depicted in Figure 1. The GF differed from the govern-
ment funded programs in term of programmatic, financial
arrangements and targets. Such comparisons informed
how difficult it would be if both programs were to
harmonize; the greater the difference, the more difficulties
in integrating. The assessment of potential impacts on PR
and their coping mechanisms and identification of the
remaining challenges contributed to recommendations to
country partners and GF on financing model which
responded effectively to these challenges.
Methodology
Qualitative approach was applied, consisting of docu-
ment reviews, in-depth interviews of key informants and
conducting a brainstorming session.
Identify remaining challenges: 










Compare programmatic and 
financial arrangement
Assess potential impacts on 
PR and their coping 
mechanisms if Global Fund 
supports were to cease




Figure 1 Conceptual framework.
Table 3 Key informants successfully interviewed
Group Profiles Number
of KI
Policy makers Member of the national AIDS committee 1
Former CCM member 1
Financing
agencies
Insurance management division, National
Health Security Office
1
Implementation Directors of primary recipient 3
Technical officers of the primary recipient 3
Directors of sub-recipient 2
Technical officers/implementers in 10
provincial health offices (PHO)*
10
Total key informants 21
Note * Telephone interviews.
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held by the PR, minutes of the meetings of the CCM
and the National AIDS Committee contributed to the
understanding of GF program operation and guided the
content of the in-depth interviews of key informants (KI).
Three groups of most knowledgeable KI who closely
involved with the GF programs were identified and
interviewed: first, all four PR and key sub-recipients; sec-
ond, government program implementers from the top
ten provinces having highest HIV prevalence based on
the 2009 sero-sentinel; third, selected policy makers and
representative from the Universal Health Coverage Scheme
(UCS) responsible for HIV prevention for the whole popu-
lation and treatment for UCS members.
Open-ended questions were used for in-depth inter-
views focusing on three broad themes:
 The nature of GF and the government sponsored
programs.
 The potential impacts on program operation if GF
support were curtailed.
 Coping mechanisms both immediate and medium
term responses.
Research ethics was approved by the Ethics Committee
of Institute for the Development of Human Research
Protections (IHRP), the Ministry of Public Health
(MOPH). Confidentiality was strictly observed. Data
and tape records were kept securely and will be destroyed
2 years after the completion of the work. The interviews
were conducted in November 2012 when 21 KI were
successfully face-to-face interviewed, except the technicalofficers in ten Provincial Health Offices were phone-
interviewed, See Table 3. Interviews were recorded with
approval and transcribed. Content analysis based on the
three thematic topics above was done manually.
The Principal-Agent Theory was applied for the ana-
lysis of the relationship and accountability between the
principal and the agent. The principal is a party who
wishes to secure provision of goods or services but does
not have the necessary knowledge and skills to do so.
The principal employs an agent to undertake this task
and delegates some control to the agent [11]. The infor-
mation imbalance leads the principal to a difficulty
whether or not the agent is acting in the principal’s true
interests [12].
There was limited accountability framework in the
government funded program in an “integrated model”
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MOPH, as a principal, does not effectively enforce its
own network of health delivery systems, which acted as
an agent, to be accountable. Either incentive or sanction
mechanisms were seldom applied by MOPH [13,14].
A half-day brainstorming session was conducted on
December 17, 2012 to solicit opinion from KI on the
way forward after weaning-off the GF support. A total
seventeen stakeholders with extensive experiences in
HIV/AIDS planning and program implementation par-
ticipated in the session. These consisted of two national
program managers, six civil society organization repre-
sentatives, six researchers, one MOPH policy maker, one
from National Health Security Office who operates the
UCS and a Secretariat of GF programs.
Results
Emerging context: increased ART expenditure in response
to mature epidemics
At the inception of the UCS in 2002, ART was not in-
cluded in the benefit packages; as medicines were too
costly and unaffordable, neither information on cost-
effectiveness nor fiscal impact was available to support
policy decision [15,16].
A considerable policy shift towards supporting univer-
sal ART took place in November 2001, when the Health
Minister pledged to gradually extend treatment to achieve
full coverage. It was not until 2003 when the universal
ART was formally launched. As a consequence, the
public-funded program was dramatically extended, by
which the number of treatment recipients reached to
over 100,000 in 2007 indicating strong health delivery
systems to accommodate scaling up. In the UNGASS
country report, in 2007, 52.9% of adult and children
with advanced HIV received ART, accounting 84.8%
of symptomatic PLWHA [17]. By 2011, ART treat-
ment was scaled to 225,000 receiving services from
943 healthcare facilities of which 96% were govern-
mental hospitals; 97% of those on treatment were
adults and 3% were children [18].
Universal ART was encouraged by multiple factors. The
success of the Government Pharmaceutical Organization
(GPO) in October 2001 in producing a first-line ARV
regimen at US$ 360 per patient year (Exchange rate
40 Baht to US$); 96% cheaper than the brand pro-
ducts, was the most important contribution to policy
change. Also the role of national and international treat-
ment advocates was prominent. The civic networks
made use of the information on ARV price reduction
to enhance their campaigns. Withholding ART ser-
vices was no longer justified when medicines became
affordable [19].
Universal ART resulted in rapid increase in spending
on treatment while the prevention proportion graduallyshrank from 21.7% in 2008 to 13.7% in 2009. Policy
makers became complacency when Thailand reversed its
epidemics. The 2006 MOPH reform weakened the func-
tion of Bureau of AIDS, TB and sexual transmitted in-
fections; transferring financing authority to National
Health Security Office resulted in lack of budget line for
prevention [20]. GF support was used to fill financial
gaps in prevention interventions.
Financing sources and implementing agencies:
government and GF program
Financing sources and implementing agencies for three
groups of population differed, see Table 4. The GF support
focused on prevention and treatment for non-Thai KAP
and migrants, with very few GF programs for Thai KAP
preventions. Civil Society Organizations (CSO) were the
implementing agents for GF supported programs, as they
had comparative advantages than government in out-
reaching to Thai and non-Thai MSM, IDU and sex
workers and migrants. Rigidity was reported in using gov-
ernment budget to supply ART for the non-Thai.
“Our target is IDU. Thai government is reluctant to
fund our work, especially for the non-Thai citizens,
also uses of illicit drug is illegal. GF is the only source,
ensuring continuity for some years. Though it requires
lots of audit, time consuming and has less flexibility.”
[KI05 PR]
Major proportions of domestic budget were for treat-
ment as GF resources cannot be used to purchase non-
WHO-prequalified ARV produced by GPO. For Thai
KAP, government outlets and CSO outreaches were ap-
plied to improve access.
“…Only delivering medicines (ART) to patients is not
adequate for the successful outcome. Patients’
participation and adherence are important. We
initiated a program to strengthen capacity of patient
group. GF money can be used for these purposes while
government budget had limitation” [KI01, 02, 03 PR]
Table 5 summarized programmatic and financial na-
ture between government and GF supported programs
which were drawn from document reviews, in-depth in-
terviews and the brainstorming session; and also inter-
pretation was made by researchers using Principal-Agent
theory.
In a bureaucrat system, priority was given to the control
of input, procurement of goods and services by rule and
regulation, while effectiveness of implementation and
performance was not so much a primary concern. The GF
result-based financing better ensured accountability of the
Table 4 Three groups of population and HIV/AIDS interventions: government and GF funded programs





Government budget Government budget + GF GF









Thai health insurance schemes GF
Implementer Government service outlet Government service outlets + CSO
outreach
CSO
Patcharanarumol et al. BMC Public Health 2013, 13:1008 Page 5 of 8
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/13/1008PR to the GF; all PR were required to comply with deliver-
ables committed with GF.
“…GF differs from government budget that it can be
used as a drive for better performance with clear
accountability framework, timeline and deliverables”
[KI12 PHO]
The implementers at provincial level also faced diffi-
culties in budget disbursement
“The GF contributes to almost 100% of our prevention
budget, whereas budget from the National HealthTable 5 Financing and programmatic nature: government and
Government programs
Duration of plan Usually annual plan and budget cycle




Cover operational cost, not on human resources incent
Accountability
framework
● Integrated model, where MOPH as principal, and its
health service network as agent, results in limited
accountability framework.
● Input focus, regulate use of resources in line with
procurement rules and regulation, less accountab
to outputs and program performance
Monitoring and
evaluation
● Not clear on timing and requirement
Limitations ● Allocation of limited annual budget to too many
government sectors (e.g. health, education, defen
social development, labour) results in fragmentati
and lack of impact
● Doubtful effectiveness of interventions such as pub
media
● Limitation to address preventions among non-Tha
population
● Poor attitude, rigidity and capacity in outsourcing
contracting services to competent non-state actoSecurity Office and the Ministry of Public Health is
small, unpredictable in terms of amount and time to
disburse.” [KI21 PHO]
Potential impacts of and responses to weaning off GF
supports
All KI were aware of Thailand non-eligible for HIV program
of GF. Half of them (11 out of 21 KI) explicitly and strongly
supported that Thailand can be and should be financially
self-reliance. The GF should support non-Thai KAP pro-
gram. Thai KAP should be the government responsibilities.
The Provincial Coordinating Mechanism used GF
resources to hire additional staffs to co-ordinate allGF
GF supported programs
Medium term program (often five years) ensures continuity
50% or more on prevention interventions
ives ● Cover all expenditures including human resources. More flexible
in procurement than government, such as syringe and needle
supplies for IDU and ART for non-Thai KAP and migrants
● Financial audits are required which can create burden for PR
● A proposal-based payment
● Clear accountability framework: the Principal Recipients as
Agents are accountable to the GF as the Principal, through
contractual agreement. Non-performance was sanctioned by
termination of grants.
le
● Focus on result and performance foster accountability and
responsiveness
● Regular progress report is required
● Annual report for monitoring and evaluation
ce,
on
● It ensures continuity of activities in some certain period
(depends on the project lifespan). However, there is
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downsizing is inevitable; provincial program would be
more affected, as they relied more on GF resources
where provincial municipalities had limited resource
capacities.
The non-state actors were key GF program implemen-
ters, especially in outreaching targeted KAP where the gov-
ernment staffs had limited capacities, either attitude, skill
or competency. Curtailing GF support raised concern how
to sustain these merits and impacts on migrants.
“GF is good. It adds more money to the program. If we
cannot get support from GF, we will have a problem
on ART for migrant. ART is very expensive. Apart from
this I did not see any negative consequences if GF
ceases support. If we can find money for migrant, it
should be okay” [KI07 SR]
Document reviews and interviews of KI confirmed that
the government funded programs secured adequate
funding on generic interventions such as, prevention in
schools or in factories, but not on KAP. The GF is the
de facto, the only funding source targeting KAP, espe-
cially non-Thai KAP and migrants through the contribu-
tions of non-state actors.
“….Though, we can spend government budget on KAP
but we are very stretched by others. We have other
routine activities such as detection and treatment of
tuberculosis DOTS, huge daily workload from NCD
such as diabetes and hypertension, and strengthening
our district, so why bother with MSM?” [KI16 PHO]
Table 6 synthesized the potential impacts and coping
strategies. A few messages emerged. To prevent program
abruption and negative impact on KAP, a transitional
financing mechanism to smooth out by phasing in new
funding source and phasing out GF support; prioritization
and resources planning among key stakeholders were
required. Though similar immediate responses across PR
and coping strategies emerged, such as mobilizing local
government and other international sources; there were
variations in financial capacities to sustain program across
PR. Some PR could mobilize resources while others
had less capacity. Some PR had planned to integrate
essential activities into annual activities supported by local
government.
“…Funding from GF is one additional to other funding
sources, we have good capacities to mobilize from
elsewhere.” [KI01 PR; KI02 PR; KI07 SR]
“…Without GF, there is little possibility (for us) to keep
the good program going on, GF is the major pot. We donot have capacities to mobilize funding as the program
is not attractive to the Government.” [KI05 PR]
Discussion
A multi-stakeholder consultation was convened where
preliminary research findings were presented and exten-
sive discussion followed. A few consensuses emerged.
The remaining challenges were access to prevention,
care and treatment by Thai and non-Thai KAP and mi-
grants. Undoubtedly, it was the Thai government legit-
imate responsibility to fully support the Thai KAP,
limitations existed in using government budget to sup-
port the non-Thai KAP. Skills and competencies to work
effectively for KAP varied across implementing agencies,
where the non-state actors had comparative advantages.
It is important to make the case for using budget
to support non-Thai KAP; for example, migrant labour
contributed to 6.2% of Gross Domestic Product [21]. Fi-
nancing health services for the non-Thai migrants should
be fully covered by the existing employer-financed health
insurance scheme, for which annual premium was
1300 Baht per individual. Its benefit package should cover
HIV prevention, care and treatment. However, the scheme
covered a fraction of migrants who were registered, while
a large part were non-registered and hence uninsured
[22,23].
The comparative advantages of the GF model, where
there was clear accountability framework under the dis-
tinct Principal Agent relationship through contractual
agreement, should be applied and replaced the current
integrated model with limited accountability framework
where MOPH played dual role: Principal and Agent.
National pooled domestic fund from national and local
governments, private sector and international sources,
dedicated for HIV/AIDS prevention (not for ART as it
was fully covered in the benefit package by the three pub-
lic health insurance schemes) was proposed and reached
consensus. It can play a strategic temporary measure to
meet the prevention challenges for Thai and non-Thai
KAP and migrants.
The concept of a national pool funding mechanism
was clear. Instead of allocating annual budget to various
agencies for broad and ineffective interventions, it
should be centrally pooled and used to purchase services
targeting the KAP from competent state and non-state
actors. Through this mechanism, the contractual agree-
ment will hold the recipients accountable through
result-based financing and monitoring of performance.
This can be managed through medium term proposal
submission, peer reviews, transparent approval, disburse-
ment based on timely deliverables. Stakeholders were
confident that this will bring significant program effec-
tiveness and accountability than the conventional “public




Capacity to survive after
weaning-off
Possible impacts, immediate responses Coping strategies
KI 01–03,
PR
High, since GF sources play
minor role, it has high
capacity to mobilize
resources
● Staff cut, though unknown future funding for
IDU and migrants
1. Merge GF program with existing governance body,
mobilize local government budget
2. Transfer ARV finance to National Health Security Office
3. Mobilize other international funders
KI04, PR Low ● Severe impact on IDU and ART for non-Thai
migrants
1. Scale down GF programme
2. Negotiate with GPO supporting ARV for non-Thai
migrants● Local staff cut, scale down or termination of
some projects.
KI05, PR Very low ● Termination of HIV prevention services for IDU 1. Change target KAP to other group that conform to
Thai government regulations in order to be eligible to
receive funding from other international sources● HIV incidence/prevalence among IDU may
increase sharply
2. Scale down and prioritize the most affected areas
KI06, PR Low ● Abrupt termination of current program 1. A national focal point is essential to manage the new
national pooled fund from domestic sources; requiring
legislation or regulations● Interim: use of savings/or remaining budget
● May be eligible for a ‘ceiling budget’ from a
single stream funding Round 10 targeting
children
2. Others: public private partnership on HIV/AIDS
Source: assessment by authors from interviews of KI.
Patcharanarumol et al. BMC Public Health 2013, 13:1008 Page 7 of 8
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/13/1008financed public provision model”. This pooled fund was
strongly advocated based on learning experiences from
the GF programs in the last decade.
One limitation was identified. A number of partici-
pants in the multi-stakeholder consultation were not
large and some of them have potential positive bias towards
a future pooled fund mechanism; driven by their positive
experiences in managing GF result-based-funding mecha-
nisms. However, this idea has yet to check with political
and bureaucratic realities, such as institutional territory. An
idea of national pooled fund requires strong political
support and leadership. It is recommended that opinions
from wider stakeholders should be solicited, in particular
views from healthcare providers, different ministry agen-
cies, fund managers, civil societies and patients.
Conclusion
A few conclusions were drawn. Effective interventions,
access to prevention and treatments were the remaining
challenges for Thai and non-Thai KAP and migrants. It
is the legitimate responsibility of Thai government to
fully finance Thai KAP programs.
Using government budget to support non-Thai is a
major contentious political debate, divided opinion
remained. The integrated model where MOPH played
dual role of Principal and Agent resulted in lack of
accountability. The public implementers had limited skill
working with KAP. Annual allocation of small budget to
various government agencies resulted in fragmentation,
ineffective to make the difference, and lack of continuity.Poor public program performance was a result of focusing
on control of procurement, but not on effectiveness and
outcome. Monitoring and evaluation were not used to
sanction the poor performing implementers. In contrast,
contractual agreement held the Agents responsive and ac-
countable to the Principal through result based financing.
If the GF were to curtail its financial support, a transi-
tional phase is needed to prevent program disruption. It is
likely that Thailand can mobilize and fill the GF gaps
though capacities varied across PR; as the GF finance
represents 15% of total AIDS financing in 2010 and 2011.
Recommendations for Thai partners
Mobilizing additional resources is as important as how
to spend them effectively and more accountable. It is
recommended to establish a national pooled financing
mechanism from various sources and centrally managed
to purchase preventive services from competent state or
non-state actors, through contractual agreement. It be-
lieved that the new mechanisms will hold partners ac-
countable and better performed.
Financing for non-Thai should be responsible by em-
ployers who benefited from their labour, through expan-
sion coverage of employer financed insurance scheme
which should cover HIV prevention and treatment.
A key limitation identified; the proposal for a national
pooled funding mechanism, replacing the current budget
allocation to government implementing agencies by a
contractual arrangement might not be politically feasible,
and may face resistance from the bureaucrats.
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A medium term bridging programs for Non-Thai KAP
was recommended. It can be programs in Thailand or in
neighbouring countries or a joint cross country program.
A transitional period according to the country context is
needed to prevent program disruption. The duration of
transitional period should be flexible based on capacity
of the country to mobilize additional resources. The GF
should support country to prepare to be financially self-
reliant.
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